Middle East Country Wars

The launch of a new Israeli operation in the North Gaza governorate on 4 October resulted in the number of political violence events in the Gaza Strip increasing by 27% compared to the month prior. Intense fighting was reported between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hamas and other armed groups, including in the Jabaliya refugee camp, a primary stronghold for Hamas in northern Gaza, where the IDF conducted two previous operations in December 2023 and May 2024. Launching intense airstrikes and shelling, Israel has ordered residents of the north to evacuate their homes and shelters and move south.1 While around 50,000 Palestinian civilians have left Jabaliya and the surrounding area, according to the Palestinian Civil Emergency Service around 100,000 people have remained.2 At least 50% of IDF airstrikes and shelling incidents during the current operation have hit civilians or civilian infrastructure, including shelters, residential buildings, schools, and hospitals in North Gaza. In several instances, Israeli forces stated that Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants were using these sites. On 29 October, Israeli warplanes targeted a five-story building in Bayt Lahiya that was sheltering at least 150 displaced Palestinians, resulting in the deaths of over 90 people, including 20 children.

Iran and Israel exchanged strikes on each other’s territory in October, marking their most serious direct military confrontation to date. On 1 October, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched about 180 ballistic missiles toward Israel. The attack followed several months of Iranian restraint after the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on 31 July in Tehran, likely due to concerns that Israel was trying to provoke Iran into an action that could draw the US into the conflict. However, following Israel’s significant escalation of hostilities against Iran’s key ally, Hezbollah, and amid statements from Israeli leaders suggesting an intent to reshape the regional order,5 Iranian leadership reassessed its calculus. The 1 October attack was stronger than the previous round in April, with the IRGC using more advanced missiles and providing little warning beforehand. Despite the large number of interceptions, missiles fell in at least 16 locations in Israel and Palestine. Some missiles landed near Mossad headquarters at Glilot Base near Tel Aviv, while others directly hit the Nevatim and the Tel Nof military bases in Beer Sheva and Rehovot.

Throughout October, Iraqi security forces, supported by the US-led Global Coalition, intensified operations against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants across Iraq. Iraqi and coalition forces reportedly killed over 50 militants, making October 2024 the deadliest month for ISIL this year. On 22 October, the parliamentary security committee announced the killing of ISIL’s ‘first rank,’ so-called Wali of Iraq Jasem al-Mazrui Abu Abdel Qader, and eight senior leaders in Kirkuk, in addition to the ISIL commander of Salah al-Din province, who was killed on 20 October.8 The escalation of operations by the Global Coalition and Iraqi forces was prompted by a surge in ISIL activities during September that included 15 attacks, twice the attacks it conducted in the preceding month.

The number of attacks by Israel in Lebanon increased by over 70% in October compared to the preceding month as Israel launched a ground offensive into southern Lebanon and significantly stepped up airstrikes. The IDF launched over 2,500 aerial attacks, mainly targeting Hezbollah’s strongholds in the south, the Bekaa Valley in the east, and the suburbs of Beirut. Several senior figures and commanders of Hezbollah were killed in October, including Hassan Nasrallah’s presumed successor Hashem Safieddine, as well as the deputy commander of the elite Radwan forces. Evacuation warnings were issued for dozens of towns and villages, covering nearly a quarter of Lebanon’s total territory,9 and an estimated 1.2 million people are believed to have been displaced.10 The death toll from Israeli attacks in Lebanon since the start of hostilities in October 2023 has reached nearly 3,000, with one-third of these reported in October 2024. Hundreds of those killed are believed to be women and children, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health.11

Northern Syria saw a marked escalation in violence in October as the Syrian regime deployed reinforcements to the frontline areas between the regime and opposition rebels. Over 400 aerial and shelling strikes were carried out by Syrian regime and Russian forces, a significant increase from over 200 incidents in September. Strikes were reported across more than 100 unique locations in opposition-held areas, resulting in at least 31 fatalities among civilians, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and other opposition factions. Additionally, over 70 shelling incidents and armed clashes, as well as two intercepted suicide drone attacks by HTS and other opposition factions, were reported. These attacks resulted in at least 30 Syrian regime soldier fatalities. This increase in Russian-supported airstrikes occurred amid escalating tensions in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel, and the potential redeployment of Hezbollah forces from Syria toward Lebanon. These airstrikes were strategically meant to demonstrate that Russia could fill any potential gaps left by Hezbollah’s withdrawal,12 thereby signaling to the opposition factions that the frontlines in northwest Syria remain uncompromised. Hezbollah has previously played a crucial role in bolstering the Syrian regime’s defenses, particularly against groups like HTS.

After a sharp decline in September, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea returned to increase in October, though remaining well below the 2024 monthly average. The attacks escalated in two main waves, primarily concentrated on 1 and 10 October, accompanied by drone and missile launches aimed at Israel. This rise in violence, primarily driven by evolving regional dynamics, prompted an unprecedented response from US forces.

The most significant attack hit the Panama-flagged oil tanker Cordelia on 1 October, targeted by four missiles and an explosive drone boat, with the latter striking directly and damaging the ship but causing no casualties.13 Overall, ACLED records 13 attacks claimed by Houthi forces against commercial ships in October, seven of which were corroborated by non-Houthi sources. In addition, the Houthis claimed the launch of missiles and drones at Israel with ACLED recording 10 attacks, the highest monthly total since the Gaza crisis began.